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Abstract—Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks con-
tinue to trouble network operators and service providers, and
with increasing intensity. Effective response to DDoS can be slow
(because of manual diagnosis and interaction) and potentially
self-defeating (as indiscriminate filtering accomplishes a likely
goal of the attacker), and this is the result of the discrepancy
between the service provider’s flow-based, application-level view
of traffic and the network operator’s packet-based, network-level
view and limited functionality. Furthermore, a network required
to take action may be in an autonomous system (AS) several AS-
hops away from the service, so it has no direct relationship with
the service on whose behalf it acts. This paper presents Antidose,
a means of interaction between a vulnerable peripheral service
and an indirectly related AS that allows the AS to confidently
deploy local filtering with discrimination under the control of the
remote service. We implement the core filtering mechanism of
antidose, and provide an analysis of it to demonstrate that con-
scious attacks against the mechanism will not expose the AS to
additional attacks. We present a performance evaluation to show
that the mechanism is operationally feasible in the emerging trend
of operators’ willingness to increase the programmability of their
hardware with SDN technologies such as OpenFlow, as well as
to act to mitigate attacks on downstream customers.
Index Terms—Distributed denial-of-service, antidose, mitiga-
tion, BPFabric, network security, network resilience, band-
width saturation attacks, network management, inter-domain
collaboration.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN A BANDWIDTH-SATURATING distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, thousands or even millions of
malicious network hosts, usually compromised machines of
unsuspecting users, conspire to flood a target host or network
with such high volumes of traffic that legitimate users are
unable to access services hosted there. Links and queues out-
side the target network but leading to it can be saturated
by traffic, leaving the target network inaccessible remotely,
regardless of its local capacity. Such attacks could be classified
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Fig. 1. Saturation zone and boundary.
according to [1] as VT-4 (Network attacks) and IV-1:PDR-1
(Disruptive; Self-recoverable).
DDoS attacks are of a simple yet very effective class [2],
but their impact in recent decades has been significant. These
attacks can generate traffic in the order of hundreds of Gbit/s
(e.g., on Github [3] and the BBC [4]), possibly through the use
of DDoS-for-hire services also known as booters [5]. In 2016,
the largest ever DDoS attack was recorded, exceeding 1 Tbit/s,
along with increased complexity and ease of deployment by
means of IoT devices, impacting organizations including many
running critical services [6]. Such incidents can translate into
millions of dollars of lost revenue, yet DDoS defense remains
an open research issue [7].
Having detected that some target1 is under attack, mitigation
of its effects remains challenging because the vulnerability of
the attack (a link’s capacity) and the target are not necessarily
in the same administrative domain, i.e., Autonomous System
(AS). Flows containing attack traffic must be filtered before
their aggregates exceed downstream link capacity, but ASes
commanding these locations lack a means to accurately deter-
mine whether a packet is good or bad as soon as it arrives.
Meanwhile, the target may have a sufficiently detailed view
to discriminate accurately, but does not command the filter-
ing locations in potentially remote ASes. If the target could
express its discriminator to sufficiently upstream ASes, mali-
cious packets could be dropped before their flows coalesce,
while letting good packets pass.
Figure 1 shows attack flows coalescing towards target T. At
some point, the aggregated volume of these flows exceeds the
capacity of the links they traverse. Network components down-
stream of such links are in a saturation zone, where inbound
capacity is exhausted, and this zone has a saturation boundary.
An attacker can draw the boundary away from the target by
1We use ‘target’ to refer to the definitive parameter of an attack, in contrast
to ‘victim’, an entity affected negatively by the attack, which usually includes
the target.
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attacking in higher volume, rendering local DDoS defense
mechanisms ineffective, and requiring co-operation across
administrative domains. The further the saturation boundary
from the target, the harder it is for the necessary actors to
take action, as the operators of network components at the
boundary are more distinct from the target service providers.
Being in distinct ASes, these actors can be unfamiliar with
each other, having no prior trust or formal relationships (such
as SLAs or peering agreements if they are more than one
administrative hop away), so they may be unwilling to co-
operate to mitigate the attack. If an AS on the saturation
boundary is to act on behalf of the target, it must be confi-
dent that the request to act is genuine (i.e., not from some
malicious actor pretending to be the target), and that it is
taking the correct action to deal with the attack (blocking
enough attack traffic, while allowing enough legitimate traffic
through). Furthermore, ASes (especially those closest to the
core) may be reluctant to bear the overhead of implement-
ing a sophisticated filter on hardware optimized for simple,
high-speed destination-based forwarding. The filtering over-
head and memory requirements must therefore be minimized,
and shown to be feasible in a high-performance AS context.
A discriminator must be carefully selected. ‘All traffic to T’
will accomplish the attacker’s likely goal (to make T inacces-
sible), but could be used in combination with source-address
filtering. Blacklists of source IP addresses may be inappro-
priate within a network if spoofing is present or the number
of malicious addresses is large. The Spoofer project2 shows
that, at the start of 2017, close to a fifth of Internet addresses,
and a quarter of autonomous systems, allow their hosts to
spoof. The analysis of backscatter presented in [8] also sug-
gests that, despite the proliferation of NAT devices, spoofing
is still widespread, and the next generation of attacks may
intelligently probe networks and adapt their behavior based
on the ability to spoof [9], [10]. When attacks involve NTP
or DNS(SEC) reflection, source spoofing is used to engineer
them, but the packets that contribute to saturation do not have
spoofed source addresses, suggesting that spoofing need not
be considered during mitigation. However, without additional
context, it is very difficult for the ASes serving the target
to determine whether any given packet has a spoofed source
address. As a result, the success of a mitigation mechanism
that does not take account of this uncertainty could motivate
attackers to use spoofing more directly, or populate the mecha-
nism’s blacklist with innocent parties, or over-populate it. As a
discriminator, a whitelist of all potential legitimate addresses
would be absurd. A whitelist of just the subset with which
the target presently communicates is much more feasible, and
could be populated only with addresses demonstrated to be
unspoofed, but poses a considerable barrier to new legitimate
clients [11].
Inside an AS, the discriminator must be able to operate
on individual packets, not just on flows or other higher-level
constructs (ASes see only the network level), without expen-
sive analysis or additional queuing delays. Packets cannot be
allowed to be queued or otherwise stored in the AS to any
2https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/
greater extent than they would under normal circumstances,
as this presents more vulnerable volume-based resources to
the attacker, as well as degrading QoS for the end users.
The deeper into the network the saturation boundary pen-
etrates, the more the network is geared to simple, high-
speed operation, and the fewer are the opportunities to
inject programming into packet forwarding. The discrimina-
tor must be simple enough to be efficiently implemented
within an AS. Filtering at line rate requires much computation
and bespoke programmable hardware operating at perfor-
mances well beyond the practical limits of software-based
systems [12]–[14].
Finally, any requirement to additionally interact with legiti-
mate peers of the target should be minimized, as any remedy
requiring new forms of interaction with the peer will suffer
from inertia. In particular, techniques that require all peers to
take part are unlikely ever to be adopted.
This paper presents the design, specification and imple-
mentation of a DDoS remedy Antidose, and we report on its
adaptation to the BPFabric environment, a high-performance
programmable data-plane fabric described in [15]. Antidose
defines a discriminator based on a whitelist of known good
peers without barring entry of new ones, whether they or the
target initiate new interactions. The discriminator can be prop-
agated across ASes, and is simple enough to be implemented
as C compiled to eBPF, a platform- and target-independent
instruction set designed for real-time packet processing, which
an AS can then deploy. By deploying the discriminator in
the BPFabric software switch environment, we determine its
ability to accurately separate target-identified ‘good’ packets
from other traffic. We contend that Antidose’s ability to dis-
criminate even in restricted environments such as BPFabric
demonstrates that automatic remedial collaboration between
networks within and at the edge of the saturation zone is a fea-
sible and practical proposition. (BPFabric can also exploit the
zero-copy packet-processing infrastructure DPDK3 and has the
potential to exploit greater hardware acceleration.) Antidose is
active only temporarily, i.e., during an attack, and only in ASes
in and at the edge of the saturation zone.
This paper makes the following contributions: motivates
and proposes Antidose; specifies the format and computation
of proofs and cookies (the essential elements of Antidose),
and the interaction of ASes to exchange them; implements
the main Antidose component as a data-plane function to be
deployed as part of network switching fabric; and demonstrates
the impact of Antidose on target-identified ‘good’ traffic ver-
sus other traffic, and shows that false positives (‘other’ traffic
mistakenly allowed to pass) remain minimal even when many
distinct ‘good’ flows are identified.
Section II discusses the nature of the most recent and
worst DDoS attacks. Section III specifies Antidose as a
collection of data structures, actors and their interactive behav-
ior. Section IV describes our implementation of Antidose.
Section V analyzes the functional behavior of Antidose, dis-
cusses potential attack strategies that could defeat it, and eval-
uates its performance under some such conditions. Section VI
3Data Plane Development Kit http://dpdk.org/.
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discusses limitations and remaining challenges of Antidose,
including some practicalities of deployment. Section VII
relates Antidose to prior work, and Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Fundamental aspects of the Internet facilitate DoS attacks
and hamper their mitigation [16]. Also, the expansion of the
Internet in recent decades has presented more potential vic-
tims, more devices to attack from/with, and more motivation
to attack. It is also easy to launch a DoS, whereas the cost of
victimhood or remedy is high. On the 21st of October 2016, the
Internet infrastructure company Dyn suffered the largest DDoS
attack to date, which resulted in inaccessibility of many ser-
vices such as Twitter, GitHub, PayPal, Etsy and others. While
details of how the attack happened remain vague, it is certain
that the Internet is fragile in the face of DDoS attacks.
An empirical study of DoS attacks observed 68 000 directed
at over 34 000 distinct victim IP addresses over roughly the
years 2001 to 2003 [17]. These attacks targeted Amazon,
Hotmail and ISPs. They were later analyzed by an independent
technology research firm4 and it was observed that they had
significant financial impact on companies, estimated at $1.2
billion in revenue during the observed period [18]. To deter-
mine the prevalence of DoS attacks, understand their nature,
and see long-term trends, we collected information about DoS
attacks reported in the SANS Newsbites news feed.5 It is
clear from these anecdotal reports that DoS attacks distributed
among many different domains and ISPs are prevalent, and
such attacks are a common threat for sites depending on
the Internet. However, there is little quantitative data about
these attacks, as operators consider such information private
or sensitive. It is also evident that there is an increasing
trend of these attacks in terms of frequency and intensity.
During 2015, the largest DDoS attack thus far was recorded at
400–500 Gbit/s, and another at the beginning of 2016 exceeded
it with 602 Gbit/s.6 The Dyn attack of October 2016 was
reported7 to have up to 100 000 malicious endpoints and an
(unconfirmed) magnitude of 1.2 Tbit/s. DDoS mitigation giant
Akamai released in their quarterly security report8 (Q1-2015)
that there was a 116.5% increase in total DDoS attacks, a
59.83% increase in application-layer DDoS attacks, a 124.69%
increase in infrastructure (layer 3 and 4) DDoS attacks, and
a 42.8% increase in the average attack duration, compared to
Q1-2014.
Based on these reports, it is evident that volumetric
(bandwidth-saturation) attacks are not likely to abate while
the vulnerability continues to exist. The emergence of ‘boot-
ers’, essentially commercial DDoS service providers, will also
increase the options available to even novices with mali-
cious intent. A remediation strategy is required that network
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yankee_Group
5https://www.sans.org/newsletters/newsbites/newsbites.php
6http://www.zdnet.com/article/attackers-targeting-bbc-donald-trump-
amazon-web-services/
7http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/
8https://www.akamai.com/uk/en/about/news/press/2015-press/akamai-state-
of-the-internet-security-report.jsp
operators find feasible and inexpensive to implement, that they
can confidently co-operate on, and that does not indiscrimi-
nately cut off all service to the attack target.
III. DESIGN
Antidose is a collection of packet formats, protocols and
functions that an AS may choose to implement to various
degrees such that it can counter a DDoS attack on a target it
has no direct knowledge of. Additional functions are required
at the target, and optionally at its peers if they initiate com-
munication with the target (i.e., it is a server, and they are
its clients). We define target agents and client agents as the
entities implementing these functions, and they need not be
integrated with the target/client, just sufficiently co-located. A
single client agent could also serve multiple co-located clients.
Antidose should be engaged only when the target agent
determines that it is necessary, and is to be disengaged when
the target agent deems the attack to be over. At all other times,
an AS should behave as normal. Temporary engagement of
Antidose is in line with the Remediate and Recover steps of
the D2R2 + DR strategy [19], whereby a normally subop-
timal network configuration is temporarily adopted during a
challenge because it prevents total loss of service.
A target agent directly asks only its hosting AS to engage
Antidose. That AS may ask its immediate neighbor ASes to
engage, and they will ask theirs in turn, etc. For the highest
levels of conformance to Antidose, this engagement only needs
to propagate just beyond the saturation boundary.
Antidose defines a portable packet discriminator that a target
agent can maintain control over remotely while participating
ASes apply it. In essence, the discriminator is a whitelist of
legitimate IP addresses (and specific port numbers if neces-
sary) currently interacting with the target, and governs filters
selectively deployed within any collaborating AS. Legitimate
clients make an effort (partially through their agents) to get
themselves into the whitelist, but only under their own IPs.
Although an attacker could spoof a whitelisted peer, attack-
ing hosts are not generally expected to know the specific set
of current legitimate peers; except by chance, traffic with a
spoofed source address should not get through a filter.
Whitelist membership decays over time, and must be peri-
odically refreshed. Although an attacker could initially behave
well enough to be whitelisted, it could then only attack using
its real address, risking exposure of its bad behavior on that
address to the target agent, which could respond by locally
blacklisting the address, and refusing to refresh it remotely.
An AS implementing Antidose for a given target T selects
filtering points within its network, and ensures that all traffic to
T goes through at least one such point. Filtering points must
be outside the saturation zone if they are to prevent attack
flows from coalescing enough to saturate a downstream link;
otherwise, when the AS is wholly within the zone, it may
still select filtering points locally, but it will also require an
upstream AS to act on its behalf.
A verification filter (VF) exists at each filtering point, and
contains the whitelist and other state pertaining to T. A VF
checks packets heading to the target, and decides to let them
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Fig. 2. Separation of verified traffic from unverified in a single AS.
pass if the source address is in the whitelist, or to throttle them
(i.e., to pipe them through a more restricted channel) if not.
Figure 2 depicts the flow of traffic through a filtering point in
an AS. The H component simply selects only traffic going to
T, allowing the rest to be forwarded in the usual manner. B is
a bandwidth restriction which will allow a small amount b of
unverified traffic through.
Whitelists within different VFs need not have the same
content. A given VF’s whitelist only needs to contain a sub-
set of peer IPs whose traffic passes through that VF, so
no synchronization between VFs’ whitelists’ membership is
required.
Whitelists are updated remotely by the transmission of flow
cookies (FCs; Section III-A) from the target agent. Clients (and
their agents) act to persuade the target agent to whitelist them,
but cannot reliably interact with the target until whitelisted,
so a second mechanism, proof-of-work (p/w; Section III-B),
is employed to get critical initial packets from the client
through the filters, which can then persuade the target agent
to whitelist the client. In cases where the target normally ini-
tiates legitimate interactions (e.g., it is a DNS client flooded
with misdirected DNS responses in a DNSSEC UDP reflec-
tion attack), this mechanism is redundant, as the target simply
issues cookies to peers it knows it is about to interact with. In
Figure 2, VF is configured with c (a proof-of-work challenge)
and k (a public key to verify flow cookies) provided by T.
Flow cookies: An Antidose flow cookie is a crypto-
graphic statement certifying that a given IP address (and
optionally a port) is permitted to send to a target. The
target agent generates cookies for a client after observ-
ing that the client is behaving well with an unspoofed
address. It withholds cookies if a client subsequently
appears to be behaving badly, allowing the client’s mem-
bership to decay from the relevant whitelists. A cookie is
delivered by encapsulating it in an ICMP Echo Request9
(a ping) from the target to the client. Assuming the client
(agent) echoes it back, verification filters will observe
it as an ICMP Echo Reply from client to target. The
9Alternatives are not precluded, but ICMP Echo requires no changes in
the client.
Fig. 3. Interaction between new client, server and intervening verification
filter (VF).
filter is separately and previously provided with the cre-
dentials necessary to verify the cookie, and adds the
sender address to the whitelist, then forwards the cookie
as normal, if it checks out. If not, the filter can safely
drop it. An asymmetric cypher is required, as verifica-
tion credentials could reach the attacker in the worst
case. Asymmetric cryptography incurs a performance
cost (sometimes greater in signature verification than
in signing [20]), although only signature verification is
required inside the verification filter. (Signing is done
only by the target agent.)
Proof-of-work: A proof of work is the solution to a
hash-function challenge. The challenge for a solver is
to identify a solution such that a hash function over var-
ious parameters including the solution yields a hash code
with a bit pattern matching another in certain bits. The
hash function must be irreversible to ensure that solu-
tions can only be obtained through brute force. A client
agent attaches proofs to packets as a form of per-packet
authorization. With access to the same parameters, a VF
can verify that a proof is correct by performing the same
hash computation. Unlike the solver, which must per-
form multiple computations to find a useful solution, the
verifier has to perform only one. Proof-of-work there-
fore places a significant processing burden on agents
of all clients (legitimate or not), but little burden on
in-network filters. Some parameters identify the flow
to which the packet carrying the proof belongs. Others
are specified by the target agent, and can be adjusted
to make the challenge more difficult, without increas-
ing the load on the verifier. Parameters can be safely
distributed to attackers, as this merely allows them to
perform verification, an operation which is of no use
to them.
The verification filter retains valid cookies and proofs that
it has already seen, so they cannot be reused. Timestamps in
cookies and proofs allow a filter to discard old ones, and retain
only the most recent ones, requiring only roughly synchronized
clocks. Greater asynchrony can be tolerated in exchange for
larger or less accurate cookie/proof sets.
Figure 3 shows how a new legitimate client interacts with
a target server and an intervening VF in forming a TCP
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Fig. 4. Byte sequence for computing flow-cookie signatures.
connection. Its initial packets are tagged by its agent with
unique and recently computed proofs-of-work, which allow
the SYN and first ACK to pass through a VF unhindered.
Responses from the server are not observed by VF, so always
pass. On reception of the first ACK, the target can be confident
that the client is using its real address, and notifies its agent10
that the client should be whitelisted, triggering the periodic
emission of flow cookies to the client. When these return and
pass through the VF, it verifies them, and adds or reinforces
the client’s identity in the whitelist. Until that first addition,
other packets from the client that do not carry unique proofs
will follow the restricted path from the VF, and will likely be
dropped.
At the start of an attack, a target server may also pre-
emptively issue cookies to its current or most recent clients,
obviating their sending of proofs.
A. Flow Cookies
A flow cookie is a non-repudiable statement made by one
peer permitting another to send to it. A cookie is formed
by signing a byte structure consisting of the following infor-
mation: a timestamp in seconds; a serial number identifying
cypher and key; the IP protocol number of the protocol that
the cookie permits; a weight for increasing the presence of the
peer in a whitelist; a list of port numbers (empty to mean all;
16-bit unsigned integers); the IP address of the permitted peer
(the subject host); and the IP address of the permitting peer.
Figure 4 shows how these fields are encoded as a byte
sequence, using network byte ordering.
A cookie itself is formed from the same byte sequence,
except that the host fields are removed, a magic word is pre-
fixed, and the signature is suffixed, as shown in Figure 5. This
structure is then encapsulated in an ICMP Echo Request, and
issued by (or on behalf of) the target host, destined for the
subject host.
The subject host having echoed the cookie back, a VF read-
ily identifies an ICMP Echo Reply with a payload beginning
with the magic word as a potential flow cookie. The serial
number identifies the cypher and key (provided to the VF
through another channel) to be used to check the signature.
10Alternatively, the agent observes the handshake, and so infers legitimacy.
Fig. 5. Flow cookie as ICMP Echo payload.
The subject host is now implicitly the sender of the packet,
while the target host is the destination.
B. Proof-of-Work
The proof-of-work computation involves an irreversible
hash function H over a tuple of several parameters and a can-
didate solution S. If bin(H (〈S , t , h, a,F ,T , l〉)) ∩ bin(2l −
1) = ∅, then S is valid.11 t is a timestamp in seconds; a is the
IP protocol; F is the ‘from’ address, i.e., the client solving the
challenge; T is the ‘to’ address, which is (part of) the target of
the attack. h is a seed and l is a difficulty level, both specified
by the target agent. The candidate solution S is always first in
the tuple input to the hash function, so that an attacker cannot
use a partial hash state computed for one solution to check
another.
h can be replaced if the target agent is concerned that it has
somehow been compromised. The agent might also suspect
that the attacker has a large amount of processing capabil-
ity at its disposal, and can respond by increasing l to make
the challenge harder. Of course, it will then be harder for all
unwhitelisted clients to find valid proofs, but it will be no
harder for verifiers. Also, each proof only allows one packet
through; a couple of proofs attached to a legitimate client’s
initial packets can buy it membership in the whitelist, obviat-
ing further proofs, while attackers who do not wish to expose
their true identities only get one packet through per average
unit of effort.
For the purposes of hashing and transmission, the timestamp
t is a 4-byte big-endian integer (as before). F and T are 4 or 16
bytes of the respective IP addresses, plus 2 bytes (big-endian)
for the port number if the encapsulating protocol supports the
concept. h and S are arbitrary-length byte sequences, though
practical limits may be imposed.
Figure 6 shows a proof-of-work encapsulated as an IP
option. Other means of attaching a proof to a packet are not
precluded.
11In other words, the bottom l bits of the hashcode must be zero.
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Fig. 6. Proof-of-work as IP option.
Fig. 7. Verification filter (VF) packet flow.
C. Verification Filter (VF)
Figure 7 shows the behavior of a verification filter. It
has a single ‘INPUT’, and four outputs (‘DROP’, ‘PASS’,
‘PRIORITY’ and ‘THROTTLE’) reflecting the four decisions
it can reach for each packet (see Figure 2). It also retains three
state entities:
• The cookie set contains valid cookies that have already
been seen, to prevent replay attacks. Duplicate valid cook-
ies are not necessarily dropped, as they might serve to
whitelist a client in a downstream VF. Indeed, duplicates
for a whitelisted address are given higher priority over
other traffic. Invalid or broken (including expired) cook-
ies can be safely discarded, as they will not serve any
purpose to a downstream VF.
• The whitelist is a set of source tuples (e.g., a combination
of IP address and protocols, and optionally port number)
of clients permitted to send to the target. Valid cookies
cause the presence of their source tuples to be reinforced
in the whitelist. Presence in the whitelist decays over
time, so new cookies for already present tuples must be
seen to retain a tuple indefinitely.
• The proof set contains valid proofs that have already been
seen, to prevent replay attacks. As with cookies, valid
duplicate proofs are allowed to pass, but as throttled traf-
fic. Invalid ones are always dropped, as it is expected that
they would be dropped in downstream VFs too.
Fig. 8. Propagation of p/w and FC credentials across AS.
Note that proofs do not influence the whitelist, so provid-
ing a proof will not directly get a potential client whitelisted.
Proof verification comes after whitelist checking, as it only
needs to be performed on unwhitelisted traffic. Whitelisting is
performed after cookie verification, as a cookie must still be
processed whether it would pass the whitelist or not. Reversing
the order (i.e., checking the whitelist before verifying the
cookie) merely results in duplicating the cookie-verification
step on alternative flow branches, and offers no protection
against attempts to overload cookie verification.
D. Infrastructure
To operate effectively, Antidose must be activated in at least
the ASes on the saturation boundary. ASes exchange Antidose
signalling information so that they can correctly set up and
configure VFs when they are needed, and deactivate them after
an attack. Antidose signalling primarily conveys the parame-
ters c, k and b, the proof-of-work challenge, the flow-cookie
credentials and the bandwidth restriction respectively. c itself
consists of <h, l>, the seed and difficulty of a proof-of-work
challenge, and also includes the hash-function type. k con-
sists of the public key corresponding to the private key used
to sign cookies, as well as type information for the cypher
and any necessary hash functions. c and k are themselves ele-
ments of series of parameters with monotonically increasing
serial numbers, allowing them to be replaced and updated if
compromised.
An AS partaking in Antidose is doing so on behalf of the
target (as well as of collateral victims, including itself), so it
must have confidence that the request to act is genuine and will
serve the target. For this reason, when the AS and target have
no direct trust relationship, they do not communicate directly.
Instead, the target’s agent communicates with the Antidose co-
ordinator of its provider AS, which communicates with the
co-ordinators of its immediate neighbor ASes, which com-
municate with their neighbors, and so on. This also has the
advantage of allowing channels to be reserved or prioritized
for Antidose communication between neighbor ASes, vital if
the rest of an AS’s bandwidth is consumed by attack traf-
fic. Figure 8 illustrates an AS with a co-ordinator receiving
Antidose parameters for target T from ‘downstream’ gate-
ways through which it currently forwards traffic to T. Having
distilled this information, it passes some of it on to other
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‘upstream’ gateways that are not currently used to deliver to
T. Simultaneously, the co-ordinator can use the information to
establish, configure and tear down VFs within the AS.
Messages are passed only between co-ordinators of adja-
cent ASes; no message is relayed across a co-ordinator, though
information in a received message may contribute to a trans-
mitted message. BGP, the Border Gateway Protocol, is a
candidate for distributing Antidose signalling, as it follows
the same interaction model. Antidose co-ordinators must also
exploit information derived from existing BGP exchanges
to determine whether specific Antidose signalling messages
should be acted upon. If a neighbor AS reports that target T is
requesting help with an attack, the receiving AS should ignore
that report while it does not route traffic to T via the reporting
AS; the report is presently deemed inactionable. This means
that, insofar as BGP routing information is correct, an AS will
never act upon a bogus Antidose signal that does not originate
from T.
AS conformance to Antidose is set at five levels:
CL0 The AS does not interact with neighbors regarding
Antidose.
CL1 The AS propagates only proof-of-work parameters,
unconditionally to neighbors.
CL2 The AS propagates only proof-of-work parameters,
selectively to neighboring sources of traffic to T.
CL3 The AS propagates proof-of-work parameters to all
CL2+ neighbors, and FC parameters to all CL3+
neighbors (Figure 8).
CL4 The AS propagates all parameters as per CL3, and
maintains VFs internally according to them.
A CL4 AS gathers all actionable reports for T (from gate-
ways 3 and 4), and computes parameters for its internal VFs. It
also computes parameters to be reported to upstream gateways
(1, 2 and 5), those not used to deliver to T. For upstream gate-
ways contributing little traffic towards T, the AS has the option
to propagate only proof-of-work parameters, with the result
that FC parameters only propagate as far as ASes on the satura-
tion boundary. When only propagating p/w parameters, they do
not need to be propagated until some traffic for T is received.
The sum of all b parameters reported upstream should not
exceed the sum of b parameters from actionable reports; each
c and k should be the latest available by serial number. As new
reports come in, or become actionable or inactionable, or as
the status of gateways changes, the AS re-gathers the reports
and re-computes new parameters to distribute to its VFs and
upstream neighbors. An AS has the option to defer propa-
gation to upstream ASes to allow parameters from multiple
neighbors to converge.
In addition to essential VF configuration parameters, an
AS may propagate statistics concerning traffic to T upstream.
These allow an upstream AS to determine whether traffic it is
not filtering is contributing significantly to the attack. Statistics
may also be propagated downstream, so that the target agent
can determine that an attack is over. It may initially respond
by increasing b and observing no detrimental effect, before
fully tearing down the Antidose instantiation.
An AS does not need to apply VFs to all incoming traf-
fic. An upstream gateway (e.g., 5) could be contributing little
to an attack, so filtering on its traffic would be superfluous;
additionally, clients using that gateway might not have been
provided with p/w parameters, and so would have difficulty
initially getting through the filter. However, if such contribu-
tions are aggregated with filtered traffic, a downstream AS
might attempt to filter it anyway, and subject traffic of clients
not participating in p/w to filtering they are unprepared for.
To mitigate this, neighboring ASes could agree to instanti-
ate a virtual gateway. The upstream AS would agree to send
its filtered and unfiltered traffic through distinct virtual gate-
ways, so the downstream AS could handle them separately. If
the upstream AS has several unfiltered inputs, it could trans-
port them internally over separate channels, and deliver them
downstream each via a distinct virtual gateway. As a result,
every distinct crossing of the saturation boundary could be
represented in the most downstream AS as a distinct virtual
gateway. As distinct gateways, a downstream AS could report
different Antidose parameters and statistics through each one.
This could be valuable when a DoS attack is not so distributed,
as routes predominantly not used by attacking flows need not
have the full Antidose mechanisms applied to them, including
distribution of p/w parameters to clients.
CL1 and CL2 are intended for ASes with the highest
performance and the least programmability, as forwarding p/w
parameters is merely a signalling function. CL2 ASes have
some basic monitoring capability to detect significant amounts
of traffic to T; CL1s have none.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented the VF component12 in a restricted
C, and translated it to eBPF using the Clang compiler. eBPF is
a virtual machine language developed out of Berkeley Packet
Filters, chosen for BPFabric as an alternative to OpenFlow
filters for its greater flexibility, its target independence, and its
statically verifiable bounded execution time, making it suitable
for high-speed switching-fabric execution.
The cookie set and proof set are each a pair of Bloom fil-
ters [21], with elements designated ‘old’ and ‘current’. Each
cookie or proof is checked against both elements of its cor-
responding pair of Bloom filters; if not present, the entity is
added only to ‘current’. Periodically, the ‘old’ set is discarded
to be replaced with ‘current’, and ‘current’ is reset. Proofs and
cookies are also rejected if their timestamps show them to be
too old or too new. A proof or cookie can therefore only be
accepted if it is both timely and not a duplicate. This strategy
prevents replay attacks without having to record known enti-
ties indefinitely, which would result in saturation of a Bloom
filter (or require unlimited memory for other techniques).
The use of Bloom filters obviates dynamic memory require-
ments. A Bloom filter with m bits, k hash functions and n
entries has a false-positive probability p ≈ (1 − e− knm )k .
An optimal k can be determined for given m and n as
kopt ∈ {mn ln 2	, 
mn ln 2}. With each hash function yield-
ing a w-bit index, we can address m = 2w slots in a Bloom
filter. We choose w = 16 so m = 65536, requiring 64 kbit per
12Antidose source code is available at http://scc-forge.lancaster.ac.uk/svn-
repos/seccrit-internal/antidose/.
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Bloom filter, or 64 kB in total. With an anticipated n = 10000
unique cookies or proofs per refresh period, kopt yields 5, so
we generate five 16-bit hash indices for any given cookie or
proof. This yields an FP rate of popt ≈ 4.3×10−2 under such
conditions.
The whitelist is a counting Bloom filter consisting of m
4-bit counters. The ‘weight’ of each unique valid cookie is
used to increment selected counters (overflows are clamped
to the maximum value) to represent increasing presence in
the whitelist. Periodically, every counter is shifted right one
bit, producing an exponential decay. Periodically issued cook-
ies should produce linear growth, which then competes with
the exponential decay to reach equilibrium. Except for false
positives, this guarantees that a tuple in the whitelist will dis-
appear within a fixed time from the point that the target agent
chooses to stop refreshing it, and this time is related to the
rate at which the agent re-issued cookies, not for how long it
had issued them.
With w = 17, the whitelist’s m = 131072 4-bit counters
occupy 64 kB. With n = 10 000 currently whitelisted clients,
kopt = 9, so we generate nine 17-bit hash indices for any
client-identifying tuple. This yields popt ≈ 1.8×10−3, so less
than 0.2% of randomly addressed attack traffic should escape
a VF under such conditions.
The hash function used for all Bloom filters is SHA-256,
and each 256-bit hash is sliced into k w-bit fields to emulate
several ‘independent’ hash functions, with the remaining 256–
kw discarded.
SHA-256 is also used for signature verification. The encryp-
tion suite is µECC,13 a small C implementation of ECDSA14
chosen for its minimal dependence on other libraries. These
are not compiled into eBPF, but are presented as external func-
tions to the main VF implementation. This is a trivially feasible
architecture for a software implementation of eBPF, and can
be designed to exploit the hardware cryptographic functions
of hardware network devices.
V. EVALUATION
This section considers anticipated and measured behavior
of Antidose under attack conditions.
A. Impact on DDoS Strategy
Unaware of Antidose, a DDoS attacker has several behav-
ioral options:
• Send packets directly to the target in an effort to saturate
its inbound links, but using spoofed source addresses, so
the target cannot identify the attacker.
• Send packets with the attacking node’s real address, but
without following usual protocol rules, e.g., any flow
control, again to saturate inbound links.
• Send packets with the source spoofed as the target to
reflectors, so that they issue unsolicited packets to the
target and saturate links.
• Send packets adhering to the protocol, but attempt to
engage the server in unproductive tasks, or make it
13https://github.com/kmackay/micro-ecc
14Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
Fig. 9. Evaluation topology N1.
use up its outgoing bandwidth supplying unwanted data,
i.e., semantic/application-level attacks, not necessarily
bandwidth-volumetric.
Antidose is intended to deal with the first three cases,
because they are ordinarily difficult to deal with (a result of
such behavior actually being consistent with good network uti-
lization from the network operator’s viewpoint). By default,
Antidose blocks everything until clients demonstrate good
behavior. In the first three cases, only packets from whitelisted
addresses get through in volume, and none of which result in
whitelisting of the used addresses. In the last case, the tar-
get can already reliably block an attacker by the identity it
had to use to adhere to the protocol, and any whitelisting
of the identity will expire without continuous consent of the
target.
To demonstrate the functionality of Antidose, we examine
a network topology N1 modelling activity near a saturation
boundary (Figure 9), and a broader topology N2 modelling
the cumulative effect of a hierarchy of VFs on coalescing traf-
fic (Figure 10). In topology N1, target T is accessed by two
legitimate clients C1 and C2. Two nodes A1 and A2 flood
UDP traffic to T in an attempt to saturate the link R1-T (the
saturation boundary), and link capacities are set such that this
occurs exactly when A1 and/or A2 are attacking. R* nodes are
Ethernet learning switches. Each VF*-MG* structure models
a single node on which a VF runs. In N2, T sits at the base
of a 3-level hierarchy of VF*-MG* structures (each modelling
the filtering efforts of a distinct AS) with a fan-out of 2. Link
capacities are in Mbit/s.
A VF* node contains H and VF components (see Figure 2).
Port-0 traffic passes through H first, and then either goes to
port 1 directly (if the source address does not match), or to
the VF. PASS and PRIORITY traffic from VF go to port 1,
and THROTTLE to port 2, which has considerably restricted
capacity, and models the B component. All traffic entering
on port 1 goes directly to port 0. No traffic is expected to
enter on port 2. MG* nodes forward port-0 traffic to port 1,
and all other traffic to port 0, so all PASS, PRIORITY and
THROTTLE traffic from a VF is merged, and appears as a
single port to any learning switch below it.
The topologies are implemented in Mininet, using BPFabric
softswitches for each switch node. The BPFabric controller is
configured to load a simple merging eBPF function for MG*
nodes, an antidose H+VF eBPF function for VF* nodes, and
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Fig. 10. Evaluation topology N2.
TABLE I
SCHEDULE FOR EXPERIMENT 1
a simple learning-switch eBPF function for R* nodes. The
controller interface allows the user to load map data to any
given node to configure it, and commands are piped to it
from the Mininet script. Learning switches build up their own
internal configuration automatically, and mergers have no con-
figuration. Antidose nodes must be provided with T’s address
and a public key to verify cookies.
In our first experiment, a Mininet script schedules the events
shown in Table I on topology N1. TCP bandwidth is mea-
sured using iperf as a server at T, and as a client at
C1/C2. iperf is used at A1/A2 to send UDP at a rate
greater than those nodes’ link rates to simulate a bandwidth-
saturation attack. Cookies are generated using the program
antidose-mkcookie.
The bandwidth measurements demonstrate the effective-
ness of Antidose from two viewpoints. In Figure 11, we see
that both C1 and C2 lose connectivity when A1 starts at
10 s. However, when VF1 is activated at 18 s, C2 recov-
ers connectivity, and only loses it again at 47 s, when A2
starts. It regains it once more a little after 58 s when VF2 is
activated.
C1 does not recover until about 28 s, having received and
returned a flow cookie from T. On its return, it passes through
VF1, resulting in C1’s whitelisting at that point. Without
refreshment, however, it loses it again at about 42 s when that
cookie’s effect on VF1’s whitelist fully decays. (4-bit counters,
a half-life of 5 s, and a cookie weight ≥ 24 − 1 = 15 yields
a total decay time of 15–20 s.) The second cookie at 52 s
Fig. 11. TCP throughput in Experiment 1.
enables a similar recovery (decaying at around 67 s),15 but it
is not effective until A2 traffic is blocked by VF2 from 58 s.
These traces demonstrate that, so long as filtering occurs
before saturation, Antidose will allow target-identified clients
outside the saturation boundary to break through filtering that
would otherwise achieve the attacker’s likely goal of remov-
ing all connectivity to T. Furthermore, T must continuously
identify legitimate clients to prevent decay from whitelists,
so T can effectively de-whitelist a previously well-behaving
client with mere patience. Meanwhile, clients that do not
have to go through filtering to reach T benefit from filtering
on rival streams.
In the second experiment, we use hping3 to send
120-byte SYN packets from A1 towards T in N1 as fast as
it can. A filter is enabled at VF1 at time 0 s, and then a
flow cookie response is generated every 0.1 s for a new IP
address, and transmitted from C1 towards T.16 The half-life
of VF1 is set high so that no entry will decay before the end
of the experiment. 30 000 distinct addresses are eventually
whitelisted, and we count the number of TCP packets to
T passing through VF1’s larger link (which must be false
positives) in 0.1 s bins, compute false-positive rates (FPRs),
and plot them in Figure 12. As designed, after 10 000 clients
at about 1000 s, FPR is still practically zero. At 3000 s, when
30 000 clients have been whitelisted, FPR is about 28.6%,
which roughly concurs with a computed p ≈ (1− e− knm )k ≈
29%, with m = 131072, k = 9 and n = 30000.
In our third experiment, we measure the impact of multiple
layers of VFs on FPR, using topology N2. Total attack-traffic
volume remains the same as in Experiment 2, but is split
across four attackers A1–A4. Similarly, cookies are generated
at 10 per second, but cycled across C1–C4. 80 000 addresses
are eventually whitelisted, so that each VF at the top level
receives 20 000, each at the middle level receives 40 000, and
the sole VF7 at the bottom receives all. We capture attack
traffic on the port 1s of VF1, VF5 and VF7, as shown in
Figure 13, to measure FPRs of VF1 alone, the VF1-VF2-VF5
system, and the complete system respectively.
15iperf stops reporting when it loses the connection, and does not begin
again before the simulation finishes, hence the C1 trace finishes here.
16C1 emulates thousands of clients by spoofing their source addresses,
avoiding performance limitations in Mininet.
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Fig. 12. False positives in Experiment 2.
Fig. 13. False positives in Experiment 3.
As VF1 experiences only the 20 000 whitelist entries from
C1, its FPR after 8000 s is at most around 7%, and this is
consistent with Figure 12 up to 2000 s (in which the same
number of addresses were whitelisted in a quarter of the time).
VF2–VF4 will behave similarly.
VF5’s whitelist eventually contains 40 000 entries (from C1
and C2 combined), so its individual FPR should be around
55%. However, the combined attack traffic it receives from
A1 and A2 has already been reduced to 7%, so the combined
FPR of the VF1-VF2-VF5 system is about 55% × 7% ≈ 3.8%,
close to the measured value of 4%. The VF3-VF4-VF6 system
will behave similarly.
VF7’s whitelist eventually contains 80 000 entries (from
C1–C4), so its individual FPR is 96%, so the combined FPR is
96% × 3.8% ≈ 3.7%, again close to the measured value, 3.8%.
In summary, while VF7’s whitelist is saturated beyond its
design, the upstream VFs closer to the saturation boundary
have already effectively reduced the attack volume.
Figure 14 shows performance measurements of the Antidose
eBPF module running in the same DPDK environment with
10 Gbit/s ports as used in [15]. With Antidose in place, but no
filter enabled within it, traffic not directed at the target almost
reaches line rate with 128-byte packets. With a filter enabled
and one IP address whitelisted, traffic from that source to the
target almost reaches line rate with 512-byte packets. We also
observed similar performance with unwhitelisted traffic to the
target, regardless of entries in the whitelist up to 10 000.
Fig. 14. Throughput in Experiment 4.
B. Counter-Attacks
An attacker that is aware of Antidose could attempt to by-
pass or game its mechanisms.
An attacker can by-pass a VF by attaching proofs-of-work,
but each must be unique, and only buys the successful delivery
of one packet. The attacker can only deliver packets into the
saturation zone at the rate it can generate proofs.
An attacker could attach proofs to the largest packets
to maximize bandwidth consumption. However, large proof-
carrying packets could be routinely dropped, as proofs are
normally only useful for small connection-initiating packets.
Proofs are tied to source addresses, so attacking hosts can-
not share proofs they have found with each other, unless they
also spoof source addresses (and regardless of how many hosts
share a proof, the number of packets that get through VFs on
the saturation boundary will be at most the number of those
VFs). The attacker might also have large amounts of process-
ing power to generate proofs. However, if the target agent
suspects either of these strategies, it can arbitrarily increase
the difficulty of generating a proof without increasing the ver-
ification effort in VFs. Meanwhile, legitimate clients are also
penalized, but two unique proofs could buy them member-
ship of the whitelist, after which no more proofs are required.
(Clearly, this counter-strategy is limited by how long W a
new client is prepared to wait to form its first connection.
With a packet size limit of Z = 86 B (a SYN including
Ethernet header and a modest p/w), and W = 8 s, an army of
N = BW2Z ≈ 12.5× 106 nodes is required to sustain an attack
of (say) B = 2 Gbit/s.)
An attacker can by-pass a VF by initially behaving well
(resulting in whitelisting), and subsequently behaving badly
by attempting to consume bandwidth within the saturation
zone. If it does so with spoofed source addresses, it achieves
nothing, as only packets using the whitelisted address as
source get through. If it uses its unspoofed, whitelisted source
address, but fails to adhere to protocol flow control, the traffic
gets through and the bandwidth is consumed. However, such
packets are more likely to reach the target or its agent, which
may allow them to determine that the whitelisted address is
being abused. They can then locally blacklist the address, with-
draw refreshment of the address in whitelists, and await its
decay.
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The attacker could by-pass a VF by behaving correctly con-
tinuously, but attempt to engage the target in useless activity.
This strategy is not covered by Antidose, and can be very
successful because it is still difficult to determine if any given
service request is genuine or bogus; an attack might be able
to overcome any discriminator at this level simply by look-
ing increasingly like a flash crowd. However, if a reliable
discriminator is applied, the remedy is simple: terminate the
connection, and block future connections from the host in the
local firewall. The attacker cannot subvert this without return-
ing to the lower-level attacks, which Antidose covers. The
problem has therefore been reduced to devising an application-
level discriminator (albeit still a very difficult problem) to be
applied in the target server.
An Antidose-aware attacker has some additional options,
attacking the remedial mechanism directly, including the
following:
1) A number of malicious clients behave normally, and
get themselves whitelisted, with the aim of saturating
whitelists to the extent that they produce more false pos-
itives. The target agent would be unable to respond to
traffic arriving on FP addresses, as it has not whitelisted
them, so it cannot unwhitelist them. While this form of
attack remains challenging, the attacker faces some dif-
ficulty with Antidose in place. Traffic must pass through
several VFs from the saturation boundary to the target,
and each may manage its whitelist differently, making
it more difficult for a given source IP address to pass
through all, especially as the attacker cannot predict
which IP addresses will pass through any given VF as
a false positive, and more so if the attacker is unable to
spoof. With CL4 support expanded sufficiently beyond
the saturation boundary expected under naïve attack con-
ditions, this chain of VFs could be increased, and attack
traffic could be prevented from coalescing sooner, so that
the initial VFs are less saturated. Additionally, under this
scenario, Antidose has achieved its goal of forcing an
attacker to make its nodes’ real addresses conspicuous
to the target agent. If the target has a means to identify
maliciously unproductive interactions, it can block their
IPs locally, refuse new connections, refuse to refresh
those IPs in whitelists, and await their exclusion from
the attack.
2) At least one attacking node transmits a flood of fake
flow cookies, to force engagement of the cookie verifi-
cation step in a VF. The VF cannot resort to sampling
flow cookies, as it will likely then miss many legiti-
mate ones drowned out by fake ones. This option is
available because no credentials are required to gener-
ate a fake cookie. If an attacker can command such a
high volume of fake-cookie traffic at a given point, then
it must be within the saturation boundary, and so VFs
should exist further upstream, where the fake-cookie
flows have not yet aggregated to the same degree,
and are still competing with regular traffic. Therefore,
VFs should not have to cope with fake cookies at line
rate, as a significant proportion of that rate would not
be cookie traffic. Downstream VFs are protected from
cookie floods because upstream VFs drop fake cook-
ies. Nevertheless, if fake-cookie floods are found to be
burdensome, alternative cyphers with less demanding
verification processes could be chosen, and need not be
indefinitely unbreakable, so long as keys can be updated
faster than they can be cracked.
3) At least one attacking node transmits a flood of duplicate
valid flow cookies, to force engagement of the cookie-
uniqueness step in a VF. This option is available because
even a malicious client can obtain a valid cookie. This
is a lighter-weight step than verification, and occurs
before it, so if verification performance is sufficient, so
is uniqueness. The first cookie will whitelist the client.
Duplicates then pass the whitelist (but do not reinforce
the client’s presence in it), and are passed on with
high priority, increasing the likelihood that they will be
observed by the target agent, who can refuse to issue
further cookies to the offending client. Lacking replace-
ments for new cookies, the original will eventually
expire, be regarded as broken, and be dropped.
4) Attacking nodes obtain valid cookies, and share them
with other attacking nodes, with the aim of saturating
whitelists in VFs farthest from the target. This option is
available if attackers can spoof source addresses, other-
wise they would not be able to transmit other clients’
cookies. The attacker only has to find a number of key
locations from which to transmit to ensure that the cook-
ies are seen by every edge VF, so this approach does not
require the attacker to use large amounts of bandwidth.
As mutual duplicates following different but converging
paths, the cookies will eventually be observed by some
VFs more than once, and will be relayed under high
priority. They are then more likely to be observed by the
target agent, which can behave as under counter-attack 3,
and refuse to refresh cookies to the hosts identified by
the duplicates.
We note that in attacks 2, 3 and 4, attacking nodes are
required to generate unusual packets that might make them
more conspicuous to their local source networks. These pack-
ets are distinguishable without having to inspect them deeply
or record a great deal of state.
For attacks 3 and 4, it might seem undesirable to give attack-
ing packets (duplicate valid cookies) higher priority. However,
under this priority, these packets are more likely to reach the
target agent, to which they positively identify compromised
(or even complicit) nodes in the attack, and which can then
withhold new cookies.
The success of attacks 1 and 4 depend on the resistance of
the whitelist to saturation, where a Bloom filter’s false-positive
rate becomes excessive. m = 217 4-bit counters occupies
64 kB, and k = 9 hash functions and n = 10000 distinct
entries yields p ≈ 1.8 × 10−3 FP rate, which we believe is
still effective at blocking unwhitelisted addresses during these
more sophisticated attacks. Variations in the hash functions at
different VFs in the chain from any given attacking node to the
target will permit an even smaller proportion of attack traffic
getting through. Furthermore, attacking nodes cannot predict
which client identities will manifest false positives.
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VI. DISCUSSION
We discuss a number of open issues, and potential problems
and solutions.
Inter-AS communication reliability during attack: It is a
premise of Antidose that each AS has a reserved or prior-
ity channel with each of its immediate neighbors over which
it can signal p/w and cookie parameters. Without such a chan-
nel, conveying 〈c, k , b〉 reliably over saturated links might be
impossible. In our favor, the quantity to be transmitted is small
and infrequent, and travels in the opposite direction to the
attack flow. Also, as direct signalling with indirect neighbors
is not required, the exact mechanism can be decided bilaterally,
and an AS can ensure that only its authorized co-ordinators
can transmit on a channel, and thus assure its peer of what it
will receive.
VF deployment options in ‘deep’ networks: Two require-
ments compete in deploying a verification filter. First, it must
be deployed sufficiently deep in the network to be beyond
the saturation boundary. Second, the deeper the network, the
less willing its operator is to deploy complex forwarding
logic beyond examination of the destination host address, as
capacities aggregate, and speed dominates requirements. Even
with hardware data-plane programmability such as proposed
by BPFabric, the overhead of a VF deployment might be
too great for the network in which it must be deployed.
However, the H component (Figure 2) has been consciously
separated from other functionality to suggest a solution in such
high-performance and low-programmability environments. H
is fundamentally a destination-host forwarding function, so
it already exists, even in deep networks. It can be used to
separate attack traffic to auxiliary devices that have greater
programmability, and so are capable of hosting VF. This is
feasible so long as the attack volume exceeds the capacity of
neither the channel that carries the separated traffic to VF, nor
the receiving hardware itself. Extended forwarding functional-
ity offered by the likes of OpenFlow and BPFabric could also
help, e.g., source hashing for load-balancing across multiple
VFs, and tunneling for reaching non-adjacent VFs.
Algorithmic alternatives: Bloom filters could be inadequate
for some scenarios, e.g., where a large number of legitimate
clients must be simultaneously whitelisted, yet false positives
must still be minimized, and memory is tight. Antidose does
not prescribe how a VF should implement its cookie sets, proof
sets and whitelist, so other data structures (including eBPF
tables) and algorithms can be unilaterally selected.
When very low FP rates are required, Bloom filters are
not terribly efficient at storing sets of small keys, such as IP-
protocol tuples, as is the case with the whitelist. To achieve
(say) p = 0.0001 with m = 131072 and k = 9, then
n ≤ 6485. Storing 6485 entries as a simple array would
require only (5+1) × 6485 < 38 kB,17 which is somewhat
less than the 128 kB required for a Bloom filter with 217
8-bit counters. However, data structures with better look-
up/insertion performance are required, and correspondingly
might have more comparable memory requirements. Hardware
174 bytes for the IPv4 address, 1 for the protocol, and 1 for the counter.
often present in routers, e.g., CAMs (content-addressable
memory), could also act as whitelists.
Even with small keys, a Bloom filter still has some favorable
characteristics:
• It has fixed size, so no dynamic memory allocation is
required.
• Its complexity (excluding the hash computation) is O(k),
whether checking or inserting, and O(m) for decay.
(The number of inserted entries n has no impact on
performance.)
• It can cope with larger and variable key sizes (e.g.,
IPv6 addresses) trivially (without any extra memory or
complexity).
Other asymmetric cyphers may be used for cookie signa-
tures, with verification performance being a key factor. The
inter-AS protocol must be able to indicate the cypher type as
well as the public key. Excessive variety should be avoided,
however, as all CL4 ASes must be using the same cypher (or
a cookie would have to contain multiple signatures).
SHA-256 could be expensive for generating Bloom filter
indices, especially as its cryptographic quality is redundant.
Non-cryptographic algorithms such as SipHash [22] are usu-
ally lighter-weight (potentially improving throughput of check-
ing smaller packets against whitelists), and hash combination
techniques can be used to generate a series of indices with
no significant loss of accuracy [23]. A cryptographic hash is
still required for p/w computations and cookie signatures, but
there is also no benefit to sharing partial SHA-256 hash states
between Bloom-filter index generation and proof/signature
verification, unless the amount to be hashed is at least 64 bytes,
as the internal hash state only changes on every 64-byte block.
Good behavior of non-TCP protocols: Antidose is designed
with the TCP handshake in mind as an indicator of good
behavior. However, it leaves detection of a successful hand-
shake up to the target agent, so it is not TCP-specific, and any
protocol with a similar handshake phase should be compatible.
Some legitimate interactions that do not involve handshakes
also can be dealt with. For example, under a DNS reflection
attack, most of the errant DNS replies will not be let through
VF nodes, as they are from hosts not legitimately communicat-
ing with the target. However, should the target need to directly
perform an external DNS look-up of its own, it will be ini-
tiating the communication to external DNS servers, and can
pre-emptively whitelist them before sending the DNS request.
(Note also that no proofs of work are required for this, and a
slightly more sophisticated H (e.g., selecting all UDP *:53 to
T:* traffic) could allow non-DNS traffic to bypass VF.)
Lack of client conformance: It is unlikely that sufficient
momentum would be gathered to upgrade a substantial number
of clients with both necessary behaviors of injecting proofs
and responding to flow cookies (although the latter is already
standard behavior, just one that is often disabled out of security
concerns). However, it is the client agent that must actually
perform these tasks and it does not need to be precisely co-
located with the client, only close enough to see all of its
traffic and modify it. The client’s ISP is in an ideal position
to do this, and can act for multiple clients, so the problem is
reduced to a per-ISP upgrade, rather than per-client. Indeed,
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this is the argument behind BCP38 in RFC2827 [24], whereby
an ISP filters its customers’ outgoing traffic to eliminate its
contribution to source-address spoofing.
Unlike BCP38, in which one ISP’s actions directly ben-
efit only other users, Antidose support in ISPs does not
require large-scale participation to benefit a participating ISP’s
customers. In general, each individual client benefits from par-
ticipating unilaterally, regardless of whether any other clients
also participate. Furthermore, participation is not required at
all under normal circumstances.
ICMP Echo exposure/NAT: ICMP Echo is chosen as a pre-
existing means to accurately deliver flow cookies to only the
whitelists on the path from subject to target, even in the face
of route changes and asymmetric routing. However, hosts may
be unwilling to respond to pings as a security risk, though it
should be trivial to distinguish response-worthy cookie pings
if the host initiated the interaction with the ping sender. In
cases where the ping sender is initiating new interactions (e.g.,
where the target is a DNS client), the receiver (a DNS server)
is already exposing itself to provide its service, and is no
more exposed by responding to echo requests with similarly-
sized echo replies. More widespread client participation would
also open up the possibility of a dedicated protocol as an
alternative to ICMP Echo. Hosts behind Network Address
Translation (NAT) share a single public address visible to the
target. Consequently, it is the NAT’s public address that is
whitelisted and all hosts behind it could be denied access due
to bad behavior of one. This can only encourage users behind
shared addresses to ensure their systems are free of malware.
CL4 conformance requirement: The highest level of con-
formance is required of all ASes within the saturation zone.
The zone is determined by the transmission capability of the
attacker, and the capacity of the ASes nearest to the target.
Antidose has been designed to impose minimal processing bur-
den on ASes so that deployment remains favorable even as one
attempts to push it deeper into the network, while also ensur-
ing that it does not open a new attack vector on such sensitive
devices. Whether Antidose is deployed in practice depends
on network operators’ willingness to deploy emerging tech-
nologies such as BPFabric, and on whether the corresponding
costs of this deployment are outweighed by the costs of other
extensions of infrastructure laid out in anticipation of future
DDoS attacks.
Saturation boundary transparency: If the source of the
attack is not well distributed, some ingresses to the satura-
tion zone might not require filtering, so clients using these
ingresses will not need to be whitelisted, nor to attach proofs.
The b parameter is intended to permit a small amount of
such unfiltered traffic, but it will be ineffective as filtered and
unfiltered flows merge downstream. Potentially, an AS could
avoid this merging by relaying unfiltered flows through alter-
native gateways, which need not be physically distinct. The
downstream AS can then issue upstream different b values
to distinct ‘virtual gateways’ according to their contribution
to an attack, allowing more for those that appear to be con-
tributing minimally. Each AS also could have the option to
avoid merging unfiltered flows, and present them as distinct
virtual gateways downstream. This would allow the ‘shape’ of
the saturation boundary to be transparent to the target AS, as
each entry point to the saturation zone would arrive through
a distinct virtual gateway to the target AS, which could then
configure each one with distinct values of b.
Proof-parameter propagation: Antidose depends on legiti-
mate clients receiving proof-of-work parameters in order to
reliably make initial contact with the target server, and this
requires widespread CL1+ conformance, at least between the
agents of the target and each client. As the set of clients of
any given host is not generally known a priori, this neces-
sitates global CL1+ conformance, and consequently global
flooding of p/w parameters! This is unlikely to happen, so are
there any alternative parameter-distribution mechanisms that
can be relied upon under an attack? If parameters are not to
be propagated AS-by-AS, receivers must be able to verify that
a challenge is genuine, as an attacker could attempt to pollute
potential clients with fake challenges. Also, the mechanism
must itself not be prone to (D)DoS (which potentially rules
out DNS).
First, we can defer propagation of p/w parameters until a
need arises. A client’s initial packet’s arrival into an AS could
trigger the propagation into the supplying neighbor AS, though
this then requires that the client try to send more packets to
complete the propagation. This still requires global CL1+ con-
formance, so a bridge is needed to cross the gulf between the
AS and the client agent directly. An AS that knows that the
next AS is CL0 could issue parameters in a packet directly
addressed to the client. To prevent abuse, it would have to
keep track of which clients have been recently informed (to
avoid becoming part of a reflection attack), and include details
of the triggering packet (so that the recipient could use it with
confidence).
VII. RELATED WORK
Many DDoS remedies have been proposed over previous
decades. Under SIFF (Stateless Internet Flow Filter) [25],
intervening routers drop packets to the target if they do not
carry a ‘capability’, a sequence of numbers which, when
indexed by the packet’s TTL, yields a code arbitrarily chosen
by the router. A legitimate client forms a correct sequence (one
matching the codes of routers the packet will pass through)
by issuing an explorer packet, to which intervening routers
add their codes. The target sends the explorer packet with
a complete capability back to the client, so only a client
that did not spoof can receive the capability. This scheme
faces a ‘denial-of-capability’ problem, in that explorer packets
might not reach the target because they compete for bandwidth
with attack packets. Explorer packets cannot be given higher
priority, as they attacker could then use them itself.
Portcullis [26] applies the concept of ‘proof of work’ (a
means by which clients may demonstrate legitimacy to a target
without its prior knowledge of them) to connection initiation.
When applied to (say) SIFF, clients add proofs to their explorer
packets, and which then automatically receive higher priority.
Attackers could do the same, but as unique proofs are required,
they can only attack at the rate that they can generate proofs.
In dFence [27], middleboxes are deployed away from the
target to separate traffic belonging to legitimate connections
from potential attack traffic. Each middlebox pretends to be
the target, and responds directly to incoming connections on
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its behalf. If a connection is established, it pretends to be the
client, relaying the connection to the target. Further, it pro-
tects itself from SYN attacks by employing SYN cookies.
VFence [28] proposes a very similar system, but exploit-
ing Network Function Virtualization (NFV) as a means to
dynamically instantiate middleboxes.
‘Flow cookies’ are introduced in [29] to allow a target to
permit traffic from a specific client to pass through a middle-
box. Cookies are generated by the target, and cannot easily be
faked. They are issued to clients, who attach them to their
packets for middleboxes to receive and verify. Packets not
containing verified cookies are disfavored by the middlebox.
In [30], inter-domain collaboration is proposed to block
identified attack flows through commands propagated on
reverse paths towards a source. It identifies the risks of coarse
filtering leading to loss of legitimate traffic, and the need for
confident inter-domain mitigation signalling. FlowSpec [31]
specifies a means for one domain to identify flows by both
source and destination that require special handling in another
domain. The vision of the IETF Working Group DOTS [32]
includes domains under attack appealing to upstream domains
to report DDoS problems, expecting help in their mitigation,
and receiving status reports to indicate when to withdraw
this help. Inter-domain colaboration exploiting increased pro-
grammability for the purpose of improved security continues
to be explored [33], [34].
Antidose combines several of the above concepts. A partic-
ipating router keeps a whitelist, and populates it on receiving
flow cookies issued on behalf of the target. Proof-of-work
is used on initial connection packets from clients not yet
whitelisted. Proof-of-work and cookie parameters are passed
between adjacent ASes, and trusted only while they apply to
downstream gateways currently used to deliver traffic to the
target.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented Antidose, a scheme allowing partici-
pating ASes to mitigate the effects of a distributed denial-
of-service attack on a target, and which is able to control
whitelists within ASes upstream of the saturation zone of the
attack. Effectively, through interaction with only immediate
neighbors, an AS with only a low-level network view of traf-
fic is given the ability to discriminate legitimate packets from
likely attack packets using criteria set by the target, which
has a higher-level (transport or application) view. We have
presented an implementation of Antidose’s critical component,
the verification filter (VF), and analyzed its behavior in the
face of various counter-attacks.
The Antidose VF is sufficiently computationally simple to
be deployed in BPFabric, a restricted execution environment
for switching fabric, with the heavy-weight operations of hash-
ing and signature verification handled externally and therefore
potentially in hardware. We demonstrated that, even in this
restricted environment, the VF correctly discriminates traffic
according to the target’s ever-developing definition of legiti-
mate and malicious peers, and that Bloom filters are effective
as whitelists even when there are thousands of simultaneous
or recent legitimate clients.
The environmental restrictions of BPFabric make it suitable
for hardware acceleration (e.g., with NetFPGA), demonstrat-
ing the feasibility of deployment of Antidose in ASes with
high-performance and low-programmability equipment. The
techniques and principles employed by Antidose reduce the
barriers to AS operators managing the automatic mitigation
of bandwidth-saturating DDoS attacks. Practical and robust
proof-delivery/whitelisting mechanisms remain open issues.
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